Analysis

Liam Nunn: Why value investors would favour a ‘Panenka’ penalty

As the 2026 World Cup kicks off, value investors should empathise with any footballer who tries a Panenka

Come 20 June, it will be 50 years to the day that Czech midfielder Antonín Panenka deceived West German goalkeeper Sepp Maier – not to mention the 30,000-odd spectators in the stadium and a considerably greater number watching on television – to score the winning penalty in the shoot-out that decided the final of the 1976 UEFA Euro football tournament.

His technique – a delicate chip down the centre of the goal in the expectation the keeper likely dives left or right – is now widely known as the ‘Panenka’ and has been employed by such footballing luminaries as Thierry Henry, Kylian Mbappé, Lionel Messi, Cole Palmer, Andrea Pirlo and Zinedine Zidane.

Not all Panenka penalty kicks end up in the back of the net, of course – and indeed we saw two misses in the English Premier league last season alone. At the end of December, Brighton’s Danny Welbeck hit the bar with his effort against West Ham and, a week later, Sunderland’s Enzo Le Fée’s attempt at Brentford was saved.

Historic miss

Far and away the highest-profile Panenka miss of late, however, was poor Brahim Diaz’s for Morocco against Senegal in the Africa Cup of Nations final in January. With a controversial match still scoreless going into the last minute of normal time, he had the opportunity – in front of a hugely partisan home crowd and with effectively the last kick of the game – to seal Morocco’s first win in the tournament since, as it happens, 1976.

(Morocco have since been awarded a 3-0 victory after the Confederation of African Football ruled the match a forfeit by Senegal – meaning Morocco were ultimately crowned champions more than two months after the event.)

In his defence, Diaz had had to wait 20 minutes to take the kick while Senegal protested the referee’s decision to award the penalty – at one point almost the entire team had left the pitch – so an already hugely pressurised situation had become a great deal more so. And in the end his attempt was so weak it barely made it into the arms of a grateful Edouard Mendy, who had not moved from the centre of the goal.

Senegal then ostensibly went on to win the match 1-0 in extra time as a swiftly substituted and understandably shellshocked Diaz watched from the dugout, clearly looking like he wanted the ground to open up and swallow him. One can only imagine the reaction across Morocco in the hours and days after the game – but the analysis from many pundits as the final whistle blew was savage enough.

Time and a place

Conveniently overlooking the fact Panenka himself had won a major trophy for his own country with the same technique – the kindest assessments suggested there was a time and a place to try it. The more vitriolic views, meanwhile, could be summed up as Diaz having no right even to contemplate attempting such an outrageous and risky – not to mention flamboyant – manoeuvre.

The thing is, while the Panenka may well be flamboyant – rarely a good look if the end-result is failure – the numbers suggest it is not especially risky or outrageous. Indeed, data crunched by sports website The Athletic show a high chip down the middle is actually a high-percentage penalty technique – and one that is significantly more likely to be successful than aiming low for either corner.

Dividing the goal into six – from the taker’s point of view, top left, centre and right and bottom left, centre and right – to analyse every penalty taken in the Premier League since 2018/19, the site found the most common areas aimed for were bottom-left (34%) and bottom-right (32%). Bottom-centre was 15% while the top three were 6% to 7%.

Higher conversion rate

Moving on to success rates for the same data, The Athletic found that higher-placed penalties lead to higher conversion rates – of 100% for top-left and top-right and 95% for top-centre, versus 84% for bottom-right and bottom-centre and 81% for bottom left. (If you think about it, that is the most natural place for the right-footed players to aim and thus, on balance, the direction goalkeepers will be inclined to dive.)

Of course, as Chris Waddle proved in England’s World Cup penalty shoot-out versus Germany in 1990, a raised penalty kick carries extra risk of continuing to rise – past the goal and into the stands behind. Still, as the above analysis illustrates, a dinked penalty – provided it is calibrated somewhere between the attempts of Diaz and Welbeck – has good odds of sailing in just below the crossbar and above the sprawling goalkeeper.

So Diaz’s decision had plenty of logic underpinning it – yet there is one crucial consideration that makes many penalty-takers think twice. If you aim for one side of the goal and the keeper saves it, that is disappointing but largely considered all part of the game. In the fullness of time, you may even be asked to star in an advertisement for a pizza chain. Miss a Panenka, however, and everybody just thinks you are an idiot.

“If you aim for one side of the goal and the keeper saves it, that is disappointing but largely considered all part of the game. In the fullness of time, you may even be asked to star in an advertisement for a pizza chain.

The good news for value investors is this potential embarrassment factor is a key behavioural reason why their approach is statistically so effective in the longer run.”

This behavioural pressure to conform can also be seen in stockmarket investing. Neatly summed up by John Maynard Keynes’s aphorism, “Worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally”, it goes a long way to explaining why so few people follow a value strategy despite the clear evidence for its success if pursued over the longer term.

When value investors buy a stock on a low multiple, it is usually because the underlying business is unloved by the wider market due to high-profile issues and negative headlines. If the investment decision then goes against you – as, on occasion, it inevitably will – you are going to have to put up with some embarrassment. After all, everyone ‘knew’ the company was a dud, just as everyone ‘knows’ attempting a Panenka is stupid.

The good news for value investors is this potential embarrassment factor is a key behavioural reason why their approach is statistically so effective in the longer run. Simply put, people would rather not risk the discomfort that is part-and-parcel of following such a high-percentage strategy. It is why pricing inefficiencies exist to be exploited by investors – and, in football, why (thick-skinned) penalty-takers will keep attempting the Panenka.

Liam Nunn is value head of research and a fund manager at Schroders